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NOTE
SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA: THE INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE ON THE RIGHT TO DIE
Zachary A. Feldmanf
Several countries across the globe have weighed their in-
terests in preserving life, in preventing suicide, and in al-
lowing terminally ill patients to end their lives at their own
discretion with, or without, the help of a physician. This Note
will highlight the inconsistencies in jurisdictions that treat sui-
cidal ideations both criminally and medically, and ultimately
argues for a uniform system of laws that govern mental illness
internationally.
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INTRODUCTION
In trying to extract exactly why a government is interested
in regulating death and dying, one runs into a complicated
cross section of religion, cultural tradition, sociology, medicine,
and psychology. Balancing the concerns and implications in
all of these areas is a sensitive task that has sparked and
continues to cause controversy across the globe, and conse-
quently results in very different governing schemes and atti-
tudes. This Note argues for an international standard to guide
medical and legal practitioners when dealing with affected indi-
t B.A. Binghamton University, Traditions of Western Philosophy, Politics,
and Law, and Classical Civilizations, 2014; J.D., Cornell Law School, 2018; Exec-
utive Editor, Comell Intemational Law Joumal, Vol. 50. Thank you to Dr. Richard
Beresford for introducing me to the fascinating world of mental health and the
law, and to Harriet, Andrew, Joshua, and Adam for their endless support.
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viduals, and aims to shed light on the inconsistent answers to
the same question from nation to nation: how should govern-
ments handle suicidal citizens? Are governments making a
distinction between a terminally ill citizen's request for eutha-
nasia and a non-terminal citizen's request, and more signifi-
cantly, should they?
The United States Supreme Court put to words why exactly
governments need to address the issue. They held in both
Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Qui 2 that there were
specific and legitimate government interests in preventing as-
sisted suicide, and that it is best left up to the states to have
"serious, thoughtful examinations of physician-assisted sui-
cide."3 Those interests were to preserve life, to prevent suicide,
to avoid the involvement of third parties and their undue influ-
ence, to protect the integrity of the medical profession, and to
avoid the proverbial slippery slope that could ensue, where
more patients request assisted suicide for less severe ifl-
nesses.4 Striking the right chord between these interests is
evidently a subjective test,5 and this Note aims to analyze some
of the ways that this balancing act has played out
internationally.
The Supreme Court did not explicitly ban assisted suicide,
but instead declared that the "right to die" is not protected by
the Constitution.6 In other words, the issue of whether to legal-
ize the practice was left to state governments. The state stat-
utes challenged in the lawsuits, which restricted assisted
suicides within their respective jurisdictions, were held consti-
tutional.7 It is legal today for doctors to assist in suicide for
terminally ill patients in California, Montana, Oregon, Ver-
mont, Hawaii, the District of Columbia, Washington, and Colo-
rado.8 Internationally, it is legal in Switzerland, Germany,
Canada, and Finland.9 Alternatively, human euthanasia is le-
1 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
2 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
3 Washington, 521 U.S. at 719; see Vacco, 521 U.S. at 808-09.
4 See Washington, 521 U.S. at 728 n.20.
5 Id. at 722.
6 Id. at 728.
7 See id. at 702; Vacco, 521 U.S. at 793.
8 Felicia Nimue Ackerman, Current Laws Permitting Assisted Suicide Are
Morally Indefensible, Vox (Dec. 14, 2016, 9:21 AM), http://www.vox.com/the-big-
idea/2016/11/21/13693016/assisted-suicide-referendums-philosophy [https:/
/perma.cc/L4VA-PU5U].
9 See Euthanasia & Physician-Assisted Suicide (PAS) Around the World,
PROCON.ORG (July 20, 2016, 7:31 AM), https://euthanasia.procon.org/
view.resource.php?resourcelD=000136 [https://perma.cc/94MV-7Q78] [herein-
after Around the World].
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gal in the Netherlands, Belgium, Colombia, and Luxembourg. 10
The important distinction between the two practices is that in
assisted suicide, the patient is given the fatal dosage in order to
administer it to him or herself." Alternatively, human eutha-
nasia allows the physician to administer the dosage.1 2 This
Note aims to add to the pertinent conversation occurring as
more states and countries put the issue to a vote of their
constituents.
One particular goal of this Note is to color the difference
between the suicidal ideations accompanying patients with ter-
minal illnesses and the suicidal ideations of non-terminal pa-
tients. Euthanasia statistics, specifically from jurisdictions
like Oregon' 3 where euthanasia has been practiced for a con-
siderable amount of time before this Note was written, suggest
that the reasons terminally ill patients request euthanasia are
not entirely different from the reasons any other non-terminal
person might attempt or request suicide. However, there re-
mains the unchallenged assumption that there is something
fundamentally different about the legitimacy of these
reasons. '4
This Note will further explore how the criminal-law system
and the psychiatric community in the United States treat sui-
cidal ideations as a symptom of mental illness, largely treatable
with effective psychological and biological medication. Juxta-
pose this practice with the legal practice of assisted suicide,
and it would appear that there is an inherent contradiction
between what science suggests about suicidal ideations and
the law. It seems that some jurisdictions concede that it is not
worth the resources to rid those with terminal illnesses of sui-
cidal ideations, despite at least the possibility of doing so.
From perhaps a more common perspective, legitimate quality
of life concerns are not treatable suicidal ideations at all;
rather, they are the same symptom, but a fundamentally differ-
ent root. Still yet, this Note will recognize situations where a
person without a terminal physical illness, but instead a
mental illness, can have legitimate quality of life concerns not
10 See id.
11 See id.
12 See id.
13 Or. Pub. Health Div., Oregon Death with Dignity Act: 2015 Data Summary,
OR.GOV (Feb. 4, 2016), http://public.health.orgeon.gov/ProviderPartnerRe
sources/EvaluationResearch/DeathwithDignityAct/Documents/year 18.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8KFJ-VLDD].
14 Id.
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taken seriously by a majority of the world's physicians.1 5 This
Note will simultaneously explore whether a rational wish to die
based on an impending death can be treatable within the
mental health context, and if so, whether it should be required
procedure within hospitals. 16 In short, this Note asks why it is
that suicidal ideations are categorized as both rational and
irrational simultaneously across the globe, and why doctors
and lawmakers have not bridged the gap or come to some uni-
versal understanding. The ultimate goal of this exploration is
to encourage lawmakers to consider the curious implications of
some of the contradicting laws that exist globally.
First, this Note will explore the premises on which Justice
Rehnquist's opinion in Glucksberg rested by evaluating suicide
and euthanasia laws internationally.1 7 Doctors and patients
alike argued that there should be a fundamental right to die
protected by the Constitution.' 8 This argument, however, tests
the notion that suicidal ideations are symptoms of mental ill-
ness, and it forces the distinction previously mentioned and so
widely accepted. If that right does exist, would principles of
medicine and psychology suggest that it is mentally ill to exert
it? Are certain people inherently exempt from this psychologi-
cal status because of their physical illness? The Court's first
conclusion was that it is in the government's interest to pre-
serve life.' 9 This assumes that if mental illnesses can be
treated biologically, the illnesses should be treated despite a
contrary, "rational" request.20 Suicidal individuals are almost
always quarantined inside hospitals and are directed to mental
health professionals for evaluation immediately following any
attempt.2 1 As this Note will explore, however, there is an argu-
ment that some non-terminal mental illnesses should be con-
sidered terminal in the sense that they are incurable, and thus
15 Ann M. Mitchell et al., Suicide Assessment in Hospital Emergency Depart-
ments: Implications for Patieat Satisfaction and Compliance, 27 ToPics EMERGENCY
MED. 302, 308-09 (2005).
16 See William Breitbart et al., Depression, Hopelessness, and Desire for Has-
tened Death in Terminally Ill Patients with Cancer, 284 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 2907,
2907 (2000); see also Suicide Prevention, NAT`L INST. MENTAL HEALTH (Mar. 2017),
https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/topics/suicide-prevention`/index.shtml#part
153179 [https://perma.cc/M7X4-U89Y] (providing possible treatments and ther-
apies for individuals with suicidal thoughts).
17 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 706 (1997).
18 See id. at 702; Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 793 (1997).
19 See Washington, 521 U.S. at 728.
20 Jouko K. Lonnqvist, Psychiatric Aspects of Suicidal Behaviour: Depression,
in THE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF SUICIDE AND ATTEMITED SUICIDE 108, 117 (Keith
Hawton & Kees van Heeringen eds., 2000).
21 See Mitchell et al., supra note 15, at 308.
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should be eligible for assisted suicide. If no amount of treat-
ment, medical or psychological, alleviates the symptoms of a
mental disease or cures the underlying biological issue, this
argument asserts that the non-life-threatening ailment is
equally intolerable. 22 If a government adopted this rationale,
requests for euthanasia might dramatically increase for a num-
ber of non-terminal ailments. One particular case in New
Jersey will illustrate this, and as this Note will additionally
highlight, a number of European countries not only find the
argument convincing, but also started to allow the practice. 23
In analyzing the next premise, the deterrence of suicide,
this Note will explore how several different countries respond to
suicidal attempts with criminal punishment. In Rwanda and
Uganda, for instance, a person who engages in nonfatal sui-
cidal behavior can be criminally convicted and sentenced to
two to five years in prison.24 Section 309 of the Penal Code in
Singapore punishes those who attempt suicide with imprison-
ment of up to one year and/or a fine, 25 and in Islamic countries
like Pakistan, suicide is punishable with incarceration in addi-
tion to the strong negative and religious implications the indi-
vidual will suffer.2 6 Suicide, and by extension mental illness,
in these particular countries is often underdiagnosed and un-
derreported, which makes analysis of the suicide rates far more
difficult.2 7 The intention of criminalizing suicide might be de-
terrence, but mental illness is entirely impossible to deter via
incarceration when there is a biological obstacle. 28 This is the
very rationale behind the insanity plea in the United States. 29
When a defendant cannot appreciate the wrongfulness of their
22 See Rachel Aviv, The Death Treatment, NEw YORKER (June 22, 2015), http:/
/www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/06/22/the-death-treatment [https://
perma.cc/M3NT-JHJP].
23 See Sarah Jorgensen, Woman with Severe Eating Disorder Wins Right to
Refuse Forced Feedings, CNN (Nov. 23, 2016, 5:22 PM), http://www.cnn.com/
2016/11/23/health/nj-woman-eating-disorder-legal-case/ [https://perma.cc/
4VQM-2DPH].
24 See Rajeev Ranjan et al., (De-) CrLminalization ofAttempted Suicide in India-
A Review, 23 INDUs. PSYCHIATRY J. 4, 5 (2014).
25 See Marian Govin, Attempting Suicide Is Illegal, but Rare for Person to Be
Charged, STRAITS TIMES (Sept. 18, 2016, 4:24 PM GST), http://www.straitstimes.
com/singapore/attempting-suicide-is-illegal-but-rare-for-person-to-be-charged
[https://perma.cc/PSF4-DUCM].
26 See Murad Moosa Khan, Suicide and Attempted Suicide in Pakistan, 19 J.
CRISIS INTERVENTION & SUICIDE PREVENTION 172, 172-76 (1998).
27 See Id.
28 See Andrew E. Taslitz, Mental Health and Criminal Justice, 22 CRIM. JUST.
4, 5 (2007).
29 See Ralph Slovenko, Pleading Insanity Is Here to Stay, Insanity Plea or Not,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 1983), http://www.nytimes.com/1983/02/14/opinion/1-
7192019]1
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conduct in the United States, punishment through incarcera-
tion will do little to deter that individual from committing the
offensive conduct again, and thus the system will not incarcer-
ate him or her.3 0 The World Health Organization, in its first
global study of suicide prevention in September 2014, con-
cluded that decriminalization does not increase suicide rates.3 1
Interestingly, the study revealed other consequences of
decriminalizing suicidal attempts that this Note will discuss.32
Next, this Note will address two premises together: (1) That
it is in the government's best interest to avoid the involvement
of third parties to avoid the use of arbitrary, unfair, or undue
influence and (2) that it is best to avoid the slippery slope that
could follow from legalization. It will do this by exploring proce-
dures and protocols for euthanasia requests in Belgium and
the Netherlands, two countries whose acceptance and legaliza-
tion of euthanasia for a wide array of non-terminal illnesses
has received both criticism and support in the international
community.3 3 It is in both these nations that the slippery slope
argument can most easily be illustrated as politicians and citi-
zens push for less restrictive statutes.3 4 With the concern for
undue influence in mind, this Note will argue that the practices
in Belgium and the Netherlands demonstrate how severe that
influence can be, and will take the position that these countries
have taken too extreme of a stance on making euthanasia
widely available.
Lastly, this Note will address how the legalization of eutha-
nasia affects, protects, and undermines the integrity of the
medical profession. Physicians and mental health profession-
als stand on both sides of the table in the euthanasia discus-
sion: some adamantly for, and some adamantly against.3 5 It is
pleading-insanity-is-here-to-stay-insanity-plea-or-not-226082.html [https://
perma.cc/BUQ3-YNHD].
30 See Taslitz, supra note 28, at 5.
31 First WHO Report on Suicide Prevention, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Sept. 4,
2014), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2014/suicide-preven
tion-report/en/ [https://perma.cc/GUG7-6EZW].
32 See David Lester, Decriminalization of Suicide in Seven Nations and Suicide
Rates, 91 PSYCHOL. REP. 898, 898 (2002) (concluding that "decriminalization of
suicide may be associated with an increase in the official suicide rate").
33 See generally Aviv, supra note 22.
34 Id.
35 See Paula Span, Physician Aid in Dying Gains Acceptance in the U.S., N.Y.
TIMEs (Jan. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/16/health/physician
-aid-in-dying.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FEuthanasia&action
=click&contentCollection=timestopics&region=stream&module=stream unit&
version=latest&contentPlacement=1&pgtype=collection&_r=O [https://perma.cc/
373X-YFEZ].
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important to note that even if a statute makes it legal to assist
in dying, this does not mean it is necessarily easy to find a
physician and accompanying pharmacy to help carry out the
request.3 6 Euthanasia procedures require several medical
physicians and pharmacists to approve and carry out the re-
quest.3 7 The words of the Hippocratic Oath can also weigh
heavily on medical professionals' decision to participate in a
practice that is at odds with their training, and it presents yet
another hurdle for that patient to overcome in assembling phy-
sicians.38 That said, some doctors use the Hippocratic Oath to
argue the converse: that the oath in fact encourages the prac-
tice of assisted death because the underlying goal of assisted
death is to ease the suffering of others.3 9
The literature on the subject generally conveys a ubiqui-
tous notion that it is unnatural to request or pursue suicide:
that a sane and otherwise stable and healthy individual could
not be interested. 40 This is deduced from not only the strict
requirements for euthanasia in the United States, but also
from the plethora of statutes worldwide that ban the practice
outright.4 1 In other words, to challenge the assumption that
only the mentally unstable request euthanasia is also to say
that one's free will, uninhibited by substance or disease, could
bring them to the thought of suicide. This assumption does not
seem to be entirely clear, though, in those parts of the world
where attempting suicide does not trigger the system to treat
that individual like a patient. On the contrary, some countries
view that person criminally, which presents a new and interest-
ing problem. 42 This alternate triggering of a criminal system,
as opposed to a medical intervention, implies that committing
suicide in those countries might be considered a sane, albeit
illegal, course of action. Just in the way the United States does
not view a thief as particularly mentally ill by virtue of his theft,
the suicidal are viewed similarly in those countries.
36 Id.
37 See id.
38 See Hippocratic Oath, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.
com/topic/Hlppocratic-oath [https://perma.cc/UH36-MPGX]. But see Peter Ty-
son, The Hippocratic Oath Today, PBS: NOVA (Mar. 27, 2001), http://www.pbs.
org/wgbh/nova/body/hippocratic-oath-today.html [https://perma.cc/C8X9-
D3J7] (noting that only 14% of modem Hippocratic oaths prohibit euthanasia).
39 See Tyson, supra note 38.
40 See Lonnqvist, supra note 20, at 108; Breitbart, supra note 16, at 2909;
Taslitz, supra note 28, at 5; Aviv, supra note 22.
41 See Khan, supra note 26, at 173; Ackerman, supra note 8; Govin, supra
note 25; Around the World, supra note 9.
42 See Aviv, supra note 22.
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The governing bodies of countries and states alike are sen-
sitively weighing their goals against what might or might not be
a constituent's right to end his or her own life. The issue de-
mands a solution, and it is no wonder that it has become such
a challenge to determine the better solution. This Note argues
that no matter the outcome, it is equally important that the
answer be consistent globally.
I
UNITED STATES AND ITS LANDMARK DECISIONS
In the landmark cases where the United States Supreme
Court set the stage for euthanasia laws, the Justices were
asked to decide whether or not the Constitution protected a
right to die. 4 3 In Washington v. Glucksberg, five physicians,
three terminally ill patients, and a non-profit organization chal-
lenged a Washington statute that made it a felony to assist in
the suicide of another.4 4 It was the contention of the plaintiffs
that the right to engage in assisted suicide was a liberty inter-
est protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution.4 5 However, Chief Justice
Rehnquist rejected that notion, saying that liberty interests not
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" were not
protected by that clause. 46
Then, in Vacco v. Quil, plaintiffs challenged a statute in the
state of New York that made it a crime for a physician to help
end the life of a patient, even if that patient was terminally ill
and mentally competent to make the decision.4 7 The plaintiffs
argued that the prohibition violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because while patients
were legally able to refuse lifesaving treatment, they could not
authorize a physician to perform any life-ending procedure.48
The Court expressly rejected the idea that these two rights were
the "same thing,"4 9 making the strong distinction between
causing someone to die and allowing someone to die.50 This
43 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 521
U.S. 793 (1997).
44 See Washington, 521 U.S. at 702.
45 See id. at 722-23.
46 Id. at 721 (citation omitted).
47 See Vacco, 521 U.S. at 797; see also Elsebeth Nylev Stenager & Egon
Stenager, Physical Illness and Suicidal Behavior, in THE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK
OF SUICIDE AND ATEMPTED SUICIDE, supra note 20, at 405 (discussing increased
risk of suicide in individuals with somatic disorders).
48 See Vacco, 521 U.S. at 793.
49 Id. at 798.
50 See id. at 793-94.
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very distinction has been recognized internationally, as several
countries have legalized one practice, but not the other.51 Both
Washington and Vacco, in upholding the state prohibitions,
made clear that the government interests at stake far out-
weighed the interests of the individuals challenging the stat-
utes.52 To reiterate, those interests were to preserve life, to
prevent suicide, to avoid the involvement of third parties and
their undue influence, to protect the integrity of the medical
profession, and to avoid the proverbial slippery slope that could
ensue.5 3 This discussion54 did not include an analysis about
the mental health of these patients-a silence this Note inter-
prets as recognition of the legitimate nature of a request for
euthanasia under certain medical circumstances.
As a result of these decisions, the states were welcome to
decide on their own how to treat euthanasia within their juris-
dictions. The Death with Dignity Act of Oregon (DWDA), ap-
proved in 1994 but not officially implemented until 1997, was
one of the first acts of its kind.55 The DWDA allows terminally
ill citizens to end their lives through voluntary self-administra-
tion of lethal medications.56 Under the law, a competent adult
who has been diagnosed with a terminal illness may request in
writing a prescription for a lethal dose of medication for the
purpose of ending his or her life within six months of his or her
probable time of death.5 7 The request must be confirmed by
two witnesses, at least one of whom is not related to the pa-
tient, is not entitled to any portion of the patient's estate, is not
the patient's physician, and is not employed by a health care
facility caring for the patient.5 8 After the request is made, an-
other physician must examine the patient's medical records
51 See, e.g., Jose Pereira, Legalizing Euthanasia or Assisted Suicide: The Illu-
sion of Safeguards and Controls, 18 CURRENT ONCOLOGY e38, e38 (2011) (noting
that assisted suicide is legal in Switzerland, but euthanasia is not); see also text
accompanying supra notes 9-10.
52 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 729-35 (1997) (evaluating
the state's interests in prohibiting assisted suicide); Vacco, 521 U.S. at 808-09
(considering New York State's reasons for prohibiting assisted suicide).
53 See Washington, 521 U.S. at 703-04; Vacco, 521 U.S. at 794.
54 See generally Washington, 521 U.S. 702 (failing to discuss the mental
health of patients interested in assisted suicide); 521 U.S. 793 (same).
55 See Mark C. Siegel, Lethal Pity: The Oregon Death with Dignity Act, Its
Implications for the Disabled, and the Struggle for Equality in an Able-Bodied
World, 16 LAW & INEg. 259, 270 (1998) (detailing the history and significance of
the Oregon Death with Dignity Act).
56 See Death with Dignity Act (DWDA), OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800-955 (1994).
57 Id.
58 Id.
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and confirm the diagnosis.5 9 If the request is authorized, the
patient must wait at least fifteen days and make a second oral
request before the prescription may be written.6 0 The patient
has a right to rescind the request at any time.6 1 Lastly, the
patient must be determined to be free of a mental condition
impairing judgment, and should either physician have con-
cerns about the patient's ability to make an informed decision,
or feel the patient's request may be motivated by depression or
coercion, the patient must be referred for a psychological eval-
uation.62 This is the part of the DWDA that is particularly
interesting because while the Act aims to exclude patients suf-
fering from mental illness, the patients who were granted eu-
thanasia listed concerns that ordinarily would qualify for
psychological treatment. 63 The DWDA requires that Oregon
run statistics on every person who requests euthanasia, 64 and
those statistics revealed that between 1997 and 2015, primary
end of life concerns were loss of autonomy (91.6%), inability to
make life enjoyable (89.7%), and loss of dignity (78.7%).65 Sec-
ondary concerns included being a burden on family and friends
and the financial implications of treatment.6 6 These concerns
are virtually the same as some of the leading reasons for unas-
sisted suicide attempts and depression generally.6 7 J. Mark G.
Williams and Leslie R. Pollock, in The Psychology of Suicidal
Behaviour, outline the "cry of pain" model of suicidal behavior,
describing suicidal behavior as an "attempt to escape from a
feeling of entrapment."6 8 It follows that the DWDA contem-
plates that while the symptoms are the same, the root of the
problem is so fundamentally different as to not entitle the indi-
vidual to the law's benefit.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Compare id. § 127.833-3.03 (prohibiting medication from being dispensed
to patients suffering from a "psychological disorder or depression"), with Mitchell
et al., supra note 15 (finding that many terminally ill patients experience depres-
sion and documenting a correlation between desire for death and depression), and
Breitbart et al., supra note 16 (same).
64 OR. REv. STAT. § 127.833-3.09.
65 Id. § 127.800-955.
66 Id.
67 See J. Mark G. Williams & Leslie R. Pollock, The Psychology of Suicidal
Behaviour, in THE INTERNATONAL HANDBOOK OF SUICIDE AND ATTEMFTED SUICIDE 79
(Keith Hawton & Kees van Heeringen eds., 2000); see also Mitchell et al., supra
note 15, at 307 (examining factors, including psychiatric illnesses, known to
motivate suicide attempts and identifying populations at a high-risk of suicide).
68 Williams & Pollock, supra note 67, at 79.
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Depression is not a valid reason under the DWDA for re-
questing euthanasia.6 9 However, the reported findings out of
the state suggest that terminally ill patients are in fact exper-
iencing symptoms of depression. 70 Elsebeth Nylev Stenager
and Egon Stenager, in Physical Illness and Suicidal Behaviour,
focus on how somatic diseases and disorders have
psychosocial consequences. 7 1 They conclude that a wide vari-
ety of physical disorders are associated with an increased risk
of suicide and suicide attempts and that health personnel
should be aware of the risk of suicidal behavior in the physi-
cally ill. 7 2 Their study is most intriguing because it proved, by
studying a number of patients with specific physical illnesses,
the systematic nature of accompanying suicidal ideations with
certain physical illnesses.73 This suggests that doctors and
mental health professionals could be equipped and on hand to
cooperate in every diagnosis linked to suicidal ideations. If
doctors can predict that patients might request euthanasia,7 4 it
is curious why they do not aim to lower the number of requests
with preventative psychological and/or psychiatric care. Addi-
tionally, Stenager and Stenager note that "hopelessness
uniquely contributes to the prediction of suicidal ideation when
the level of depression is statistically controlled for, not only in
the psychiatric disorders but also in the terminally l."76 This
further illustrates the conflict this Note highlights: the differen-
tial treatment of patients with these ideations. The governmen-
tal interest in preserving the lives of citizens could in theory be
just as strong within the hospital walls as it is outside of them.
If symptoms of depression can be isolated, then physicians
must aim to treat those symptoms in addition to the terminal
physical ailment.76 If successful, it is then that the fundamen-
tal difference might rear its head: the sane and otherwise not
depressed individual requests euthanasia. The DWDA and
laws like it operate on the conclusion that this is occurring.
69 See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800-955.
70 See William Breitbart et al., supra note 16, at 2909 (finding a correlation
between depression in terminally ill patients and increased desire to hasten
death); see also Barry Rosenfeld, Assisted Suicide, Depression, and the Right to
Die, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. PoLY & L. 467, 474-76 (2000) (collecting studies examining
the relationship between terminal illness, depression, and the desire for death).
71 See Stenager & Stenager, supra note 47, at 406.
72 See id. at 417.
73 See id. at 412.
74 By looking for physical disorders noted in supra note 67.
75 Stenager & Stenager, supra note 47, at 412.
76 See Ackerman, supra note 8.
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II
PRESERVING LIFE AND DETERRING SUICIDE
INTERNATIONALLY
Historically, the influence of religious institutions on gov-
ernments has always been significant and instrumental in
shaping the positions governments take.7 7 Even in the United
States, where the government has taken extraordinary mea-
sures to separate church and state, it is not too difficult to see
that religious influences can motivate political opinions, and,
occasionally, motivate judicial decisions.7 8 A most prominent
example is the large demographic of United States citizens who
oppose gay marriage because the Bible directly forbids it.7 9 In
the realm of death and dying, religion too plays a very strong
role. The Catholic Church, for instance, stands behind the
commandment that "[t]hou shalt not kill,"8 0 and emphasizes
that every human life has equal value regardless of mobility or
intellect. 8 ' This principle challenges those in support of eutha-
nasia, and it is especially problematic in cases where mobility
and intellectual capabilities are so minimal as to be the pri-
mary reason for the request. The medical community is in
severe disagreement over the concept of brain death, and what
skills and/or capabilities a person or body needs to have in
order to be considered "alive." 82 In The New Yorker, Rachel
Aviv recounts the curious case of Jahi McMath, a teenage girl
who was brought across state borders in order to remain on life
support because states not only have a different definitions of
what it means to be dead, but also different requirements of
hospitals in honoring the religious beliefs of its patients.8 3
It should be noted that Americans do generally support the
practice of euthanasia for the terminally ill.8 4 In conducting a
77 See Ranjan et al., supra note 24, at 4.
78 See Nigel Barber, Why Religion Rules American Politics, HUFFINGTON POST
(July 20, 2012, 3:34 PM EST), https://www.huffmgtonpost.com/nigel-barber/
why-religion-rules-americ b_1690433.html [https://perma.cc/8LL9-TFBM].
79 See Katharine Q. Seelye & Janet Elder, Strong Support Is Found for Ban on
Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/21
/us/strong-support-is-found-for-ban-on-gay-marriage.html [https://perma.cc/
U7XR-Z3NH].
80 Exodus 20:13 (King James).
81 Euthanasia and Assisted Dying, BBC (Aug. 3, 2009), http://www.bbc.co.
uk/religion/religions/christianity/christianethics/euthanasia_1.shtml [https://
perma.cc/9M3Q-L7EX].
82 See Rachel Aviv, What Does It Mean to Die?, NEW YORKER (Feb. 5 2018),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/02/05/what-does-it-mean-to-die
[https://perma.cc/6KCP-WAHXI.
83 See id.
84 See Span, supra note 35.
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poll for the General Social Survey, researchers out of the Uni-
versity of Chicago found that for the last 15 years the propor-
tion of Americans responding positively to the idea stayed
between 66 and 69%.85 This data suggests that citizens are
often sympathetic to those who wish to end their lives, but this
contributes to the dilemma regarding differential treatment.
Those who attempt suicide on their own in the United States
and are unsuccessful are routinely confined and kept for ob-
servation for a period of time within a hospital's walls.8 6 Those
individuals are subject to psychiatric evaluations by trained
medical professionals." The practice of psychiatry would then
require pharmacotherapy combined with classic therapy treat-
ment to effectively treat that patient."" Both the medication
and the dialogue with a therapist aim to combat the mental
illnesses at work and to help that patient cope with their situa-
tion. Large bodies of clinical data prove that there is a genetic
susceptibility to suicidal behaviors, often manifesting when an
individual is stressed or ill.89 In short, depression requires
medical treatment.9 0 While any individual who wishes to die
but who does not have a terminal diagnosis could be medically
treated to alter their chemical imbalance, the legitimate nature
of a terminal patient's desire to end their life is not given the
same weight, even though that patient could benefit from simi-
lar courses of treatment.
In the face of this medical understanding, a number of
countries across the globe still do not view suicidal ideations as
a form of mental illness, and instead criminalize the behavior
and punish attempts with incarceration.9 1 One such example
is Singapore, where citizens share the notion that criminaliza-
85 JdL
86 See Mitchell et al., supra note 15, at 308.
87 See id.
88 See What Is Psychiatry?, AM. PSYCHIATRIC AsS'N (2018), https://
www.psychiatry.org/patients-families/what-is-psychiatry [https://perma.cc/
Z4V4-GFPQ].
89 See Karl Andriessen & Alja Videtic-Paska, Genetic Vulnerability as a Distal
Risk Factor for Suicidal Behaviour: Historical Perspective and Current Knowledge,
54 SLOvENIAN J. PUB. HEALTH 238, 238 (2015), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pmc/articles/PMC4820161/pdf/sjph-54-03-238.pdf [https;//perma.cc/UT7K-
R4TX]; see also AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N STEERING COMM. ON PRACTICE GUIDELINES,
PRACTICE GUIDELINE FOR THE ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT OF PATIENTS WITH SUICIDAL
BEHAVIORS 42 (2013), https://psychiatryonline.org/pb/assets/raw/sitewide/
practice-guidelines/guidelines/suicide.pdf [https://perma.cc/TL9G-E74E].
90 See NAT'L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, DEPRESSION: WHAT You NEED To KNOw 3
(2015) ("Most people who experience depression need treatment to get better.").
91 See Ranjan et al., supra note 24, at 6.
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tion acts as a useful deterrent.9 2 In an article in The Straits
Times, an English daily newspaper based out of and printed in
Singapore, the prevalent sentiment on suicide was that it im-
pedes on the progress of the city-state.93 Although those who
attempt suicide are rarely convicted due to the despondent and
delicate emotional nature of the individuals, the law remains
unsympathetic.9 4 The implications of a statute like this di-
rectly challenge the understanding of mental illness in the
United States, while the practice of not convicting recognizes
its futility in the law.9 5 Incarceration can only deter those who
have the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of their act.9 6
For this reason, the criminal law system in the United States
generally requires the mens rea element, or guilty mind.9 7 A
mentally incompetent individual is unable to have a guilty
mind, which is why the American system allows for their in-
sanity defense.9 8 This discrepancy between the systems sug-
gests that countries like Singapore do not link suicidal
ideations with chemical imbalances, despite an overwhelming
body of knowledge in the medical community that suggests
otherwise.99
The alternate insanity defense has to do with the actus rea,
or guilty act.10 0 This means that the person lacks the ability to
resist the offensive conduct. This is attributed again to a
mental or physical condition preventing the individual from
exercising reasonable control of his or her body.1 0 1 Some
states are reluctant to accept an actus reus defense because
although scientific studies might indicate a chemical inability
to control an impulse, a huge proportion of the prison popula-
tion likely suffers from some degree of this chemical imbal-
92 Cf Shaffiq Idris Alkhatib, Death Penalty 'a Powerful Deterrent,' STRAYTS
TIMES (Apr. 5, 2017, 5:00 AM SGT), https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/
death-penalty-a-powerful-deterrent [https://perma.cc/VV59-WVHN] (typifying
the Singaporean view that criminal law is a useful deterrent).
93 See Govin, supra note 25.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Michael D. Slodov, Criminal Responsibility and the Noncompliant Psychiat-
ric Offender: Risking Madness, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 271, 276 n.32 (1989)
(summarizing why punishing the insane fails to advance the deterrence functions
of criminal law).
97 See Slovenko, supra note 29.
98 See id.
99 See Ranjan et al., supra note 24, at 6.
100 See Slovenko, supra note 29.
101 See Kenneth B. Chiacchia, Insanity Defense-Insanity Defense Statistics,
Problems with NGRI, Guilty but Mentally Ill, PSYCHOL. ENCYCLOPEDIA http://psychol
ogy.jrank.org/pages/336/Insanity-Defense.html [https://perma.cc/8A6Y-RZ
GRI.
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ance.1 0 2 Finding them all not guilty by reason of insanity
would be very dangerous to society at large, and would lead to
the slippery slope judicial bodies are inclined to avoid.10 3 The
alternate verdict some states have adopted is guilty but men-
tally il.1 0 4 This theory recognizes mental illness but simulta-
neously punishes the defendant for the crime-in essence
deciding that the mental defect was not the actual and proxi-
mate cause of the crime. 0 5
III
CULTURAL NORMS, RELIGIOUS INFLUENCES, AND
LEGISLATION
In Islamic and Hindu countries like Pakistan and India,
respectively, the religious implications of suicide are quite se-
vere. 10 While attempted suicide was decriminalized in India in
2014, a study of 200 attempted suicide victims at a hospital in
India showed that only 46.2% of males and 26.6% of females
were even aware that it was a criminal act to attempt suicide
prior to the new law. 107 The Law Commission in India finally
conceded that attempting suicide is the "manifestation of a
diseased condition of mind" that needs treatment and care
rather than punishment.10 However, noted criminal lawyer
Nitya Ramakrishnan fears that if the truth is manipulated,
many deaths will be "camouflaged as suicide."' 0 9 In response
to the World Health Organization listing India as one of the
countries with the highest suicide rates in 2012, a Mental
Health Care Bill in 2013 was passed that explicitly states that
any person who attempts suicide shall be presumed, unless
proved otherwise, to be suffering from a mental illness at the
time of the bid.110 More dramatically, the bill seeks "to provide
102 JIL
103 See id.
104 See Slovenko, supra note 29.
105 See Chiacchia, supra note 101.
106 See Ranjan et al., supra note 24, at 4; see also Khan, supra note 26, at 172,
174.
107 Manan Kumar, Attempt to Suicide No More a Criminal Defense, DAILY NEWS
& ANALYsis (Dec. 11, 2014, 7:40 AM IST), http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-
attempt-to-suicide-no-more-a-criminal-offence-2042938 [https://perma.cc/
6585-M622].
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 See id.; see also PTI, New Mental Health Bill Decriminalises Suicide, HINDU
(Aug. 21, 2013 19:15 IST), http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/new-
mental-health-bill-decriminalises-suicide/article5O45156.ece [https://per
ma.cc/V92A-97D5] (discussing introduction of Bill) [hereinafter New Mental
Health Bill].
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for mental health care for persons with mental illnesses and to
protect, promote and fulfill the rights of such persons during
the delivery of mental health care and services.""' The bill
also came after India ratified the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, requiring it to protect
disabled persons. 1 1 2 Described as "humane and progressive,"
India's Health Minister J.P. Nadda said the bill will help provide
more support to India's population, 27% of which the World
Health Organization says suffer from depression.' 1 3 However,
while a progressive bill, the warning from Ramakrishnan sug-
gests again that the statistics coming out of India are likely
unreliable.
Indian government officials are additionally concerned with
the social stigma attached to mental illness." 4 Suicidal death
is associated with bringing dishonor to an entire lineage and
carries a heavy social burden on surviving family members in
both the Hindu and Islamic religions."1 5 Hinduism excludes
those who die via suicide from achieving "salvation," and those
who die from suicide are denied customary funeral rituals.1 16
Although there is no particular principle of Islam that forbids
attempted suicide, scholars suggest that the religion has
strong sanctions against it.11 7 These traditional attitudes in-
form reporting patterns and ultimately shape the efforts gov-
ernments are putting into protecting, preserving, and even
saving vulnerable lives.
In Pakistan, Section 325 of the Pakistan Penal Code ad-
judges attempted suicide as a criminal offense punishable with
one year of imprisonment and/or a fine.' 18 One study con-
cluded that 39% of women and 21% of men in Pakistan had
11 See New Mental Health Bill, supra note 110.
112 See id.; see also Dep't of Econ. & Soc. Aff., Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), UNITED NATIONS (Dec. 13, 2006), https://
www.un.org/development/desa/disabilities/convention-on-the-rights-of-per
sons-with-disabilities.html [https://perma.cc/2RD8-QQ8C] (showing India's rat-
ification of the Convention).
'13 See PTI, Rajya Sabha Passes Mental Healthcare Bill, INDIAN EXPRESS (Aug. 8,
2016, 7:30 PM), http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/rajya
-sabha-mental-healthcare-india-mental-health-parliament-illness-2962059/
[https://perma.cc/X45G-42Y8] [hereinafter Rajya Sabha].
114 See id.
115 See id; see also Ranjan et al., supra note 24, at 4.
116 See Ranjan et al., supra note 24, at 5.
117 See Khan, supra note 26, at 172; see also Michael Rubin, Does the Koran
Condemn or Condone Suicide?, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 12, 2015, 1:44 PM), http://
www.newsweek.com/does-koran-condemn-or-condone-suicide-298719 [https://
perma.cc/WAU9-HJ47] (examining the theology of suicide in Islam).
118 See New Mental Health Bill, supra note 110.
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contemplated suicide, and the World Health Organization in
2002 reported almost 16,000 suicide cases in the country.1 19
At such high rates, it is reported that citizens often bribe law
enforcement officials in order to avoid criminal charges when it
is believed someone has killed themselves.1 2 0 It is this very fact
that makes the figures in Pakistan again so unreliable-if
16,000 cases were reported, how many additional cases were
not reported for fear of repercussions, both criminally and so-
cially?l21 The situation in Pakistan undoubtedly is in need of
mental health resources to both educate and help reshape pol-
icy and attitudes. It is evident that the concept of euthanasia
would be quite inapposite to the cultural norms there, despite
the number of citizens who have suicidal ideations.1 2 2 This
lack of recognition for these symptoms of depression and other
illnesses likely contributes to these high rates because the citi-
zens are too afraid, and simply unable to, seek out the neces-
sary help. The government interests listed by the Supreme
Court of the United States are even more persuasive when
superimposed onto Pakistan: governments should aim to pre-
serve the lives of constituents, but without recognizing what
modem science has deemed a curable chemical imbalance,
lives will be lost.1 2 3
Surprisingly, Pakistan simultaneously offers its criminal
defendants the insanity defense.1 2 4 If we accept the assump-
tion that suicidal individuals are suffering from mental illness,
then it should appear strange that those individuals are held
criminally liable for their actions. In the United States, defend-
ants are permitted to use the insanity defense in order to ex-
cuse their behavior.1 2 5 This by definition means that the
defendant has been proven guilty or has admitted to the wrong-
doing, but due to their mental state, cannot be held criminally
liable.126 Instead, the individual is held for psychiatric evalua-
119 Id.
120 Jd
121 See Rajya Sabha, supra note 113.
122 See Muhammad Nasir Afzal et al., Attitude of Pakistani Doctors Towards
Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide, 60 Pak. Armed Forces Med. J. (2010), http://
www.pafmj.org/showdetails.php?id=304&t=O (https://perma.cc/L6X5-SJNA].
123 Rick Nauert, Depression's Chemical Imbalance Explained, PSYCH CENT.,
https://psychcentral.com/news/2006/11/09/depressions-chemical-imbalance-
explained/398.html lhttp://perma.cc/DA3R-DCYB] (last updated Aug. 8, 2018).
124 Ashraf Al, "Plea of Insanity" as a Defense in Pakistan (Analysis of the
Celebrated Judgements of Superior Courts), 4 INr'L J. HUMAN. & Soc. Sci., 270,
273-76 (2014).
125 See Chiacchia, supra note 101.
126 See id.
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tion and, if cured or rendered stable, will be released at a date
that has no correlation to what his or her prison sentence
would have been had they been declared competent at the time
of the crime. 127 In Pakistan, the defense works much the
same.1 28 This illustrates a new contradiction: one can be ex-
cused of his or her crime by way of mental illness, but will be
incarcerated for an act that substantial scientific data has de-
termined is also due to mental illness.12 9 While mental illness
does not always rise to the level of insanity, it does support the
notion that criminalizing the behavior is inconsistent with the
goals of criminalization. Suicidal ideations are associated with
depression-a medically recognized disease of the mind usu-
ally accompanied by a chemical imbalance.13 0 Almost 90% of
suicides may be related to depression.131 Pakistan has re-
markably gone under the radar with this conflict in its system;
it seems illogical that suicidal persons are not excused via the
insanity defense for attempting to take their own lives. 13 2
In their attempt to determine how Islamic physicians view
euthanasia, Muhammed Nasir Afzal, Rabia Latif, and Tahir
Ahmad Munir found that most physicians rejected the con-
cept. 1 A survey of 105 doctors with moderate Islamic teach-
ing showed that 86% were against the idea of legalizing
euthanasia, and only 9% believed in the practice for those were
suffering from "intractable pain."' 3 4 This is consistent with the
other findings out of Pakistan that suggest an aversion to the
concept of ending a life with intention, with no exception taken
for those with terminal illness.13 5 This model is almost at the
opposite extreme as some of the other countries this Note will
explore, and it begs the question, how far should governments
be able to elevate moral religious beliefs over medical science?
The assertion that "suicidal ideations are indicators of de-
pression" has a strong counter in some cultures; namely, the
practice of honor suicides in Asian countries like Japan.1 3 6
127 See Taslitz, supra note 28, at 5.
128 See Ali, supra note 124, at 270, 273.
129 See Mitchell et al., supra note 15, at 305.
130 See id. at 306; see also Nauert, supra note 123.
131 See New Mental Health Bill, supra note 110.
132 See Lonnqvist, supra note 20, at 107 ("[Studies concluded over the past 40
years suggest that depression is found in 29-88% of all suicides.").
133 See Afzal et al., supra note 122.
134 ICL
135 Id.
136 See Lissette Padilla, Why the Japanese See Honor in Suicide, SEEKER (July
8, 2015, 1:00 AM), https://www.seeker.com/why-the-japanese-see-honor-in-sui
cide-1501524382.html [https://perma.cc/VZ4J-NZ9H].
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The Japanese culture historically believed that suicide would
preserve a family's honor.' 3 7 By framing suicide as "responsi-
bility-driven," done in hopes of clearing debts and affording
beneficiaries any payout from the death, Japanese people find
the act to be selfless.' 3 8 Perhaps then the suicidal Japanese
person, in hopes of providing for his family, who suffers no
terminal illness and previously had no history of mental illness,
is experiencing a legitimate suicidal ideation without biological
causes due to Japanese cultural norms. It is difficult to recon-
cile this position with almost any position that categorizes de-
pression as a "disease," but it further illustrates how cultural
conditioning influences both governments and medical profes-
sionals in handling affected individuals. '3
It is this Note's position that the government's interest in
preserving life should outweigh an individual's intentions
against their own preservation. With proper treatment and
care, the mental health community in this country believes
that those who wish to end their life early can be persuaded or
treated into no longer feeling that way.14 0 Those countries who
believe that criminalizing this behaviorl4' is the proper ap-
proach are missing the heart of the problem: that mental ill-
ness prevents effective deterrence. In countries like Pakistan,
where governments recognize what mental illness is but choose
to ignore it in the context of suicide, this Note urges policymak-
ers to extend their understanding about why individuals at-
tempt suicide.1 4 2 Although experienced mental health
professionals are the most capable of picking up on behavioral
patterns that are indicative of suicidal ideations, accurately
predicting suicide is not an exact science. 143 Professionals de-
voted to the prevention of suicide have had to acknowledge
their limitations and focus their efforts on relieving the despair
that is more often than not the proximate cause of the ultimate
suicide or attempted suicide.'14
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 See Sara Reardon, Suicidal Behavior Is a Disease, Psychiatrists Argue, NEW
SCIENTIST (May 17, 2013), https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn23566-sui
cidal-behaviour-is-a-disease-psychiatrists-argue/?cmpid=RSSNSNS2012-GLO
BALonline-news [https://perma.cc/9Y3H-P8A5].
140 See Mitchell et al., supra note 15, at 306.
141 See Ranjan et al., supra note 24, at 6.
142 See Khan, supra note 26, at 172, 174.
143 See Robert D. Goldney, Prediction of Suicide and Attempted Suicide, in THE
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF SUICIDE AND ATTEMFTED SUICIDE, supra note 20, at 585,
593.
144 See id. at 593-94.
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Published in 1992, David Lester's instrumental study on
suicide legislation examined suicide rates over a period of ten
years (five of which were in countries that criminalized suicidal
behavior and five of which were post-decriminalization) and
revealed an interesting outcome. 145 Canada, New Zealand, and
Ireland showed no change at all pre- and post-decrininaliza-
tion.1 4 6 The Ireland study, however, did show a change of a
different kind.1 4 7 The study concluded that the legalization of
suicide was not associated with a significant increase in sui-
cide deaths, but did have an effect on the number of undeter-
mined death verdicts.14 8 This speaks to the implications that
the "suicide" classification has on a society at large when the
act itself is criminalized. While that study did not address this
increase, this Note posits that there is good reason for this. 149
When suicide is illegal, classifying a death as a suicide has
legal and financial ramifications.15 0 The classification of man-
ner of death is important to their next-of-kin most notably for
financial reasons. 151 It was in the best interest of families to
avoid admitting that suicide had occurred.1 5 2 As a caveat, Les-
ter did also conclude that in countries where the suicide rate
went up post decriminalization, the recording methods of those
suicide deaths were less efficient and somewhat unreliable, a
common issue this Note previously encountered in countries
like Pakistan and India. 5 3
Deterring suicide and preserving life are persuasive gov-
ernment priorities that foreign countries need to consider
against their constituents' requests. While religious and cul-
tural beliefs are evidently strong prevailing counterarguments,
this Note asserts that medical science demands a particular
response. These countries across the globe might be trying to
accomplish the same goals, but as this Note concludes, with no
145 See Lester, supra note 32, at 898; see also Ranjan, supra note 24, at 6
(discussing Lester's study in the context of decriminalization arguments).
146 See Lester, supra note 32, at 898; see also Mugtaba Osman et al., "Suicide
Shall Cease to be a Crime": Suicide and Undetermined Death Trends 1970-2000
Before and After the Decriminalization of Suicide in Ireland 1993, 186 Irish. J.
MED. SC. 201, 202-03 (2016) (elaborating upon Ireland's pre- and post-
decriminalization trends).
147 See Osman et al., supra note 146.
148 Id. at 203-04.
149 See P. Lindqvist & L. Gustafsson, Suicide Classification: Clues and Their
Use-A Study of 122 Cases of Suicide and Undetermined Manner of Death, 128
FORENSIC SCI. INT'L. 136, 140 (2002).
150 See Ranjan et al., supra note 24, at 5.
151 See id.
152 See Khan, supra note 26, at 172-74.
'53 See Ranjan et al., supra note 24, at 5.
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success.1 5 4 In fact, it is the situations elsewhere that bring
greater credence to Chief Justice Rehnquist's premises here at
home. The question remains whether or not even allowing eu-
thanasia to occur at all in the states that legalize it adds or
takes away from the government's ultimate goal.
IV
THIRD PARTIES, UNDUE INFLUENCE, AND THE
SLIPPERY SLOPE
In Washington v. Glucksberg, The Supreme Court of the
United States held that the following government interests were
heavy enough to outweigh the interests of the challenging pa-
tients and physicians: avoiding the undue influence of third
parties on those individuals who might seek euthanasia15 5 and
avoiding the potential of a slippery slope of increasing euthana-
sia requests for less severe illnesses.15 6 In attempting to prove
the value of these premises, the current political and medical
professional climate in Belgium and the Netherlands serve as
helpful anecdotes.
In the fascinating true story of a Belgian woman named
Godelieva De Troyer, Rachel Aviv of The New Yorker recounts
the story of how De Troyer suffered from severe and incurable
depression.' 5 7 De Troyer subsequently sought euthanasia af-
ter exhausting her medical options because she was convinced
she could not be relieved of her depression.s1 5  In other words,
she considered her depression terminal.15 9 Conveniently,
Belgium views itself as rather progressive in its laws that legal-
ize assisted suicide. ' 6 0 The "right-to-die" movement, as Aviv
writes in The Death Treatment, has gained popularity in Euro-
pean countries.161 Although most Belgians who are
euthanized have terminal diagnoses, people have been
euthanized there for autism, anorexia, borderline personality
disorder, chronic-fatigue syndrome, partial paralysis, blind-
ness coupled with deafness, manic depression, and trans-
gender status.1 6 2 Wim Distelman, the founder of Life End
Information Forum (LEIF), is a strong proponent of allowing
154 See id. at 5-6.
155 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 n.20 (1997).
156 See d. at 702.
157 See Aviv, supra note 22.
158 See id.
159 Id.
160 See id.
161 IcL
162 See id.
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those who wish to end their lives to do so.16 3 The right to a
dignified death, he writes, is an accomplishment of secular
humanism, a belief system recognized by the Belgian govern-
ment.1 6 4 The laws in Belgium seem to view suicide as a medi-
cal treatment "stripped of its tragic dimensions."16 5 To most
Americans, however, some of those diagnoses are far from legit-
imate reasons to request euthanasia. 6 6 This brings up the
concern of undue influence. With such a pervasive practice of
euthanasia in Belgium,1 6 7 it forces one to question how influ-
enced De Troyer was to be euthanized. No doubt it was a
combination of the teachings and philosophy of humanism and
Distelman, 16 8 combined with the sheer capability of doing so
for her non-terminal disorder that influenced her decision. 169
In 2001, the Netherlands became the first country in the
world to legalize euthanasia for terminal patients suffering
from diseases with no possibility of a cure.1 70 Further, Edith
Schippers, the Health Minister of the Netherlands, read a letter
to the Dutch government in late 2016171 arguing that the laws
surrounding euthanasia should be less restrictive in order to
accommodate a growing older community of citizens who had
"completed life," a phrase which this Note highlights has no
medical significance.1 7 2 In 2015, almost 4% of all deaths in the
country were via euthanasia.1 73 Opponents worry that this is
the beginning of the slippery slope that the Justices of the
Supreme Court were worried about.1 7 4 A populist politician in
the Netherlands, Geert Wilders, argued that the country should
combat depression instead of enabling those who wish to
die.175 The issue is that although euthanasia is masked as a
163 See id.
164 See id.
165 Id.
166 See Scott Hensley, Americans Support Physician-Assisted Suicide for Termi-
nally Ill, NPR (Dec. 28, 2012 7:39 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-
shots/2012/12/27/168150886/americans-support-physician-assisted-suicide-
for-terminally-ill [https://perma.cc/M5WZ-QXAX].
167 See Aviv, supra note 82.
168 Id.
169 Jd
170 Dan Bilefsky & Christopher F. Schuetze, Dutch Law Would Allow Assisted
Suicide for Healthy Older People, N.Y. TIMEs (Oct. 13, 2016), https://www.ny
times.com/2016/10/ 14/world/europe/dutch-law-would-allow-euthanasia-for-
healthy-elderly-people.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FEuthanasia
[https://perma.cc/Q5CK-MM6D].
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172 Id.
173 See id.
174 See id.
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"purely individual choice,"17 6 the reality is that the choice to
end one's life affects everyone around that individual from close
family members and friends, to health care providers and the
community at large.' 7 7 In a study led by Dr. Scott Y. H. Kim, a
psychiatrist and bioethicist at the National Institutes of Health,
patients declined treatments that could have helped or all to-
gether alleviated their suicidal ideations in more than half of
approved doctor assisted deaths in the Netherlands between
the years of 2011 and 2014.178 Depression was the most com-
mon diagnosis.17 9 This statistic is particularly troublesome
and undoubtedly stems from the "progressive" attitudes pre-
vailing there. Despite the very real possibility of treating these
patients, the country has opted to grant their wishes. This
Note argues that this is a devastating blow to what should be a
government's ultimate goal of preserving the lives of its
constituents.
Professor of Psychiatry at Columbia University, Dr. Paul S.
Appelbaum, noted that "[tihe criteria in the Netherlands essen-
tially require[s] that the person's disorder be intractable and
untreatable, and this study shows that evaluating each of
those elements turns out to be problematic."1s0 According to an
article in the New York Times, people in the Netherlands were
leaving their treating primary physician and going to a clinic
funded by euthanasia advocacy organizations that exist solely
for the purpose of providing euthanasia assistance.'a' These
health care providers aim to measure the levels of suffering and
disease in each of its patients-a job Dr. Appelbaum argues is
best left to the original treating physician. 18 2 This Note argues
that in the Netherlands, the barrier between ordinary citizen
and desired death on command are wholly insufficient. The
question that is left unanswered is whether any of the individu-
als requesting euthanasia are truly mentally competent enough
to do so. In granting requests to individuals suffering from
depression, schizophrenia, or just loneliness, this Note argues
176 See id.
177 Id.
178 See Benedict Carey, Assisted Suicide Study Questions Its Use for Mentally
Ill, N.Y. TIMEs (Feb 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/11/health/
assisted-suicide-mental-disorders.html [https://perma.cc/W4GD-M7DM; see
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that countries like the Netherlands and Belgium are euthaniz-
ing mentally incompetent persons.
In the United States, the slippery slope may have already
started. In November 2016, a New Jersey court granted a
woman the right to refuse forced feedings. 18 3 The judge an-
nounced that the court recognized her right to "live free from
medical intervention."'84 The state argued that the ruling was
essentially allowing the woman to die. 185 Although euthanasia
is not legal in New Jersey, 8 6 one cannot help but assess the
validity of the state's argument. There exists a fine line be-
tween physician-assisted suicide and allowing someone to in-
evitably die. This woman was not declining treatment, but was
instead declining basic nutrition.' 8 7 This case in New Jersey is
quite distinguishable from the typical case the Supreme Court
imagined when it initially made the distinction between al-
lowing and causing.'8 8 The woman here was suffering from a
mental disease, one that could not be considered "terminal"
due to its treatable nature.18 9 To support this point, the state
included in its brief some of this very same woman's state-
ments.19 0 She had stated that she believed that any person
over 65 pounds was "obese"-which this Note argues is enough
evidence alone for any mental health professional to conclude
that she was mentally incompetent to make rational decisions
regarding her own health. '9' This ruling allowed her to be
removed from her feedings, and thus characterized her mental
illness as "terminal" given that she immediately entered pallia-
tive care.1 9 2 While the decision in New Jersey' 9 3 by no means
implies that this woman was being euthanized, the fact re-
mains that this woman's mental health disorder led her to have
clear suicidal intentions, and she was granted the chance to let
that happen.
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V
CONTROVERSY WITHIN THE MEDICAL PROFESSION
The Hippocratic Oath taken by those entering the medical
practice states the obligations, goals, and proper conduct of
doctors. 1 9 4 A growing number of physicians, however, feel that
the Oath has become inadequate because it does not address
the realities of the modern medical world. 195 Physician-as-
sisted suicide, with its growing rates of acceptance and legali-
zation, was explicitly banned in the classic version of the
Oath. 9 6 An earlier Oath read, "I will neither give a deadly drug
to anybody who asked for it, nor will I make a suggestion to this
effect."' 9 7 A more modern version reads, "[I]t may also be
within my power to take a life; this awesome responsibility
must be faced with great humbleness and awareness of my
own frailty."19" The mantra of "do no harm" must weigh heavily
on physicians, who are told that "[albove all, I must not play at
God."' 9 9 It is not surprising to learn, then, that it can be diffi-
cult for patients to find a physician willing to recommend them
for euthanasia. 20 0 The entire practice of euthanasia, it would
seem, is antithetical to the medical profession. Physicians who
are proponents of the practice suggest that in some cases, pro-
viding euthanasia services is truly giving the patient the care
he or she needs.20 1 Preserving dignity, they argue, could be the
best medical help a physician could provide to a patient in
need. 202
Felicia Nimue Ackerman, a professor of philosophy at
Brown University, wrote in a piece for Vox that a "society that
'pathologizes' suicidal feelings of indignity and degradation ...
while endorsing them in the terminally ill is . .. engaging in a
horrifying, odious form of bigotry."203 What she means is that
the discussion should not be between legalizing assisted sui-
cide for terminally ill people or not, but between legalizing it for
194 See Tyson, supra note 38.
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196 See id
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all people, or not.204 The difference is subtle, but significant.
She aims to say that society is legitimizing the depression faced
by those terminally ill patients, but is discounting it for every-
body else. 2 0 5 In legalizing assisted suicide for a subclass of
people, society is saying the life it aims to preserve for all other
people is intrinsically more valuable. 206 She argues that those
who suffer from depression or live in undesirable conditions
are no more likely to face some drastic change than the termi-
nally ill patient is to die. 2 0 7 She points out that by not allowing
assisted suicide for all competent adults, those patients not
terminally ill but suffering from depression or the like will only
continue to suffer for longer.208 It seems then that Ackerman is
either in full support of either extreme: the seemingly on-de-
mand practices in the Netherlands, 2 09 or the nations like Paki-
stan that categorically do not recognize the practice. 2 10 The
United States, in its inconsistent treatment of the subject, is
squarely at odds with her theory. Ackerman uses the rape
victim as an example of a person who might consider living to
be undignified in the same way that a person suffering from a
debilitating disease might consider their life undignified. 2 1 1
The statistics from Oregon suggest that the reasons the state
accepts as legitimate for desiring euthanasia are almost exactly
the same as the reasons patients without terminal illnesses
request euthanasia. 2 1 2 Ackerman forthrightly rejects the idea
that society should try to protect "dignity" for the former class
of persons, and not the latter. 2 13 Her ultimate suggestion is
that the United States should aim to biologically treat those
terminally ill patients for their depression with the same rigor
that we try to treat depression in non-terminal patients. 2 14
Laws that allow one and not the other for competent adults are
placing less value on one person's life over another-a position
she contends is hard to swallow.2 15 Ackerman points out that
"[the terminally ill are not the only people who may have strong
and stable suicidal desires grounded in conditions that are
204 Id
205 See id.
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unlikely to change." 2 16 In short, the reasons we do not allow
competent adults who are not tenninally ill to choose assisted
suicide are identical to the reasons we are allowing it for the
terminally ill, 2 1 7 and this Note finds this argument particularly
persuasive.
Although Ackerman refuses to "take a side" on the matter,
there are pros and cons to both alternate systems of euthana-
sia laws. 2 18 Ackerman refuses to place a value on life for good
reason,219 but she fails to address value at all. A physician
does not frivolously hand out the diagnosis of terminally ill.
The law gives a presumption of competence to medical profes-
sionals in their work,220 and just because one course of treat-
ment does not work for a patient does not make the treating
physician liable unless there is evidence of negligence. 22 1 As a
result, the characterization of "terminal" has heavy implica-
tions, and this Note fears that Ackerman is not giving the word
the depth it deserves. If a doctor consents to euthanasia, his or
her definitiveness that the patient is close to death is purport-
edly high.2 2 2 With imminence and inevitability so strong, per-
haps the value judgment of whatever life is remaining
necessarily results in zero. Additionally, the argument that
those with terminal illnesses should be treated for depression
with the same vigor as any other individual has implications.
Leaving the consideration of financial resources, potential out-
comes of a course of treatment, or the hastening effects of a
terminal illness to lawmaking bodies or even physicians is ask-
ing them to play the role of God forewarned by the Hippocratic
Oath. Even in a situation where a terminal illness is present
and major depression is effectively treated, the forces at work
against the patient are resilient and relentless. 2 23 The underly-
ing conclusion just might be that it is pragmatic to accept that
a certain and impending death is a legitimate and incurable
reason for depression. The alternative effectively denies those
who are truly suffering from a dignified end, and it is difficult to
take that position in light of the pain and suffering terminally ill
216 See id
217 See id.
218 See id
219 Id.
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patients often face. The states must answer these difficult
questions, and as is obvious, some countries were quicker than
others to come up with their own conclusions.
Haider Javed Warraich, a fellow in cardiovascular medicine
at Duke University Medical Center, penned an opinion piece for
the New York Times entitled, On Assisted Suicide, Going Be-
yond 'Do No Harm,' where he advocated strongly for euthana-
sia. 2 2 4 His first point is that in some situations, "doing no
harm" actually means providing the life-ending service re-
quested by the patient. 22 5 When a disease has a patient writh-
ing in pain, a doctor could plausibly decide that performing
euthanasia was the best course of action. 226 This is even con-
sistent with the conservative physicians of Pakistan. 2 2 7 Dr.
Warraich's second concern has to do with the fact that patients
with severe depression and suicidal ideations are already per-
mitted to request treatment withdrawal, noting again the dis-
tinction drawn by the courts between causing someone and
allowing someone to die. 2 2 8 Withdrawal too is a life-ending
request, so refusing an otherwise not depressed patient from
making a similar request does not quite feel consistent.2 2 9
Next, Dr. Warraich states that doctors and nurses freely push
opiate prescriptions on terminal patients, but the government
does not seem to realize that these drugs also hasten death
because they can slow down breathing to the point of a com-
plete stop. 23 0 This method of sedation seems to escape all
scrutiny, despite its similarities. 2 3 1
The article continues to rebut the slippery slope argument
rather convincingly. 2 3 2 Dr. Warraich cites a study for the Jour-
nal of the American Medical Association revealing that although
legalization of euthanasia has increased worldwide, there is no
evidence that the percentage of citizens requesting the practice
has increased at any alarming rate and in fact continues to be
relatively rare. 2 3 3 He also argues the fact that the majority of
patients who request and receive euthanasia are older, wealth-
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ier, and white suggests that the legalization of euthanasia does
not expose poor and/or vulnerable populations to the practice
in any substantial way, thus combating the undue influence
premise of the Supreme Court's opinion. 234 Interestingly, in
another study cited by Dr. Warraich in an article, the facts
indicate that immediately following the legalization of euthana-
sia in the Netherlands, there was a huge increase in re-
quests. 235 However, the rates eventually stabilized at around
5,000 requests a year.2 3 6 Dr. Warraich used this same study to
suggest that the numbers made doctors more comfortable with
the idea of euthanasia, and thus more likely to address pre-
death comfort needs to avoid ever having to receive the request
in the first place. 2 3 7 The predictability, then, assisted physi-
cians in keeping those numbers down.
Lastly, Dr. Warraich cites a study that indicated that medi-
cal error was the third leading cause of death in the United
States.238 He brings this up to say that the "do no harm" argu-
ment fails already right here in the United States. The study
conclusively showed that doctors are in fact causing a lot of
harm already.23 9 Although not as convincing a point, Dr. War-
raich aims to conclude that legalizing euthanasia will not in-
crease death rates as we might expect. In short, he argues that
euthanasia can be a preferable course of action over experi-
mental surgeries.240 It is likely physicians would support the
idea of limited euthanasia due to the nature of pain and suffer-
ing, but for each individual the analysis is vastly different.
While blanket rules would not serve useful in assessing
whether or not a patient can rightfully and competently request
assistance in dying, this Note argues that the post-request as-
sessment of competency is of the utmost importance, and thus
needs to be consistent and conclusive.
CONCLUSION
In determining that the states have legitimate interests in
preserving life, the Supreme Court declined to legalize eutha-
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nasia. 24 1 The balancing test that the states now conduct con-
siders and implicates human dignity, state resources, the
entire medical profession, and several important government
interests. 24 2 In a quest to figure out which governing regime is
most effective in curbing suicide rates and preserving life, this
Note has seen that governments around the world are at odds.
All that is known is that a government's recognition of mental
health, its professionals, and the treatability of diseases all
play a significant role. While some countries have used their
criminal system to carry out their goals, others have exploited
their mentally incompetent in order to save themselves the
resources. Still yet, other countries allow religious influences
to justify their expenditure of resources in incarcerating af-
fected individuals and leaving terminally ill patients in hospi-
tals. This Note concludes that the inconsistency amongst the
states and countries globally places very different values on the
lives of constituents and provides very different degrees of con-
trol over one's own life-and it is this fact that is most
troubling.
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